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I! I "THE UTAH COURT f ¥ APPEALS 
STATE OF UT ? 1 31 : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, . ; ' U'dbe No, 90054 0-CA 
v. j 
RONNIE S BROOKS, : Priority II '" 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated sexual 
assault,, a first degree felony, imi violation of Utah Code Ann 
7 !„»""' "J - 4 II | I "I I l l J mi HI II I'lii'iji rr:i v a I'„e«i1 III" u r y I d it | i I' i i:st d e g r e e 1 e I , 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. % 7G-6-20 3 (1990), in the Third 
Judicial District C o m I in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honoic. -- james . .
 v 
This Court * ,-J jurisdiction t, *-d: * r Is appeal pursuant to 
Utah " - 1 * 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1 1 1 i " i d < I c m II i i l l in II 1 i ii 1 1 i l l II 1 1 II in "• l i I \ i mi 1 1 II i i l ( - M I I iif" I n mi I in in ( i l 
a t t o r n e y ? AJ. dppeJ Id It LMJI ! w\ I ' ** i i I i * ci J c o u i t s 
f i n d i n g of a v a l i d w a i v e r o n l y i f thu f i n d i n g I s c l e a i l > i n e r r o r 
mi mi mi I In in in I i mi i ill mi I nil i in1! 11 I mi in S e e S t a t e >ILM l luqcli i iyn , 
717 P,2d 1348 (Utah 1986) (i n m i ii I ext ol «-i waivei ot the right to 
remain silent). 
2 . pi'ii p o l l ) iiJiiuLi iJiullL IL JUL:11 JIIJJI y on 
reasonable doubt? An appeal challenging refusal to give a jury 
instruction presents a question of law. Carpet Barn v. State of 
Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The trial court's 
legal conclusion is not accorded any deference and is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 
1249,1251 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah Const. Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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STATEMENT UF THh LAM 
Defendant, Ronnie S. Brooks, was charged with aggravated 
sexual assault, a first deqree felony, in violation oi Ul.dli i I*1 
P 5 1 0 5 ( ii I i1 | i.i i i.i V H I o i I I i n i q I d i , , Il in i r I 111-'i | i i-'t-
f e l i ' . y , x n v i o l a t i o n o i U t a h C o d e A n n - § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 J 1195:10 | | II "J • 
6 ) , Af te r a jury t r i a l ill I nndant was convic ted of both mnn tp 
( I i 1 II II 'I II ill I II i * ( o i i c l i ' i i i II d i d i . i L ' i i I o m o i I i IIIII I  II II II mi mi mi I i i i a i i d d I 11 I I-
'term of 10 yeans to life on the aggravated sexual dssau.lt 
conviction arid a term ot fivp years to 1 i fo nun the aggravated 
fan i y 1 a i y c.i in ( J I I 11 IIIII I, I I Ii I I mi IIIII I 11 I HI so i 11 MI II i mi I i y j 
t h e s e n t e n c e d e h j m l a n t was t h e n s e r v i n g a t t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n 
(R. 1 2 2 - 2 3 ) . DeiendanL t i m e l y f i l e d a n o t i c e of aj: \ . x^w-
3 
On F e b r u a r y 26 , 1991, t h i s Court t e m p o r a r i l y r ;:nandei ' h i s 
cas r in | lm> Thi oil i l iudioial P u t i i r t r i m i l fun i o s o l o j 
i s s n nl wlliii I 11 to de l oiinliiiii L J i y h l Lo t e s t i f y had I . o l a t e d 
by h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l . After1 a h e a r i n g on t h a t i s s u e , th t t r i a l 
c 1 1 n 1 1 I II u i n i r II l 11 in 1 1 I I i I I i - » f i » i in i II i ! II II l mi mi i II II II l 1 1 1 f i I mi If" I,» III in I in i II mi II Il  III i P e n 
violated 11/ 158-59) (a copy oi I lie older is all niched hereto as 
Addendum A ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The only facts pertinent to this appeal are the findings ~f 
the trial GUUJLL, attached i :n Addendum A 
SUMMAR 1 OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's right to testify was not violated by hi s trial 
counsel because defendant concurred with the advice oi counsel 
-3-
that he not testify. Although the right to testify is 
fundamental, the trial court has no affirmative duty to inquire 
sua sponte on the record as to defendant's waiver of that right. 
From a defendant's silence and failure to raise the issue the 
waiver may be inferred. 
The reasonable doubt instruction that was given is identical 
to the instruction approved by this Court, and the case of Cage 
v. Louisiana, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 328 (1990), is not 
applicable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF WAS NOT 
VIOLATED BY TRIAL COUNSEL BECAUSE DEFENDANT CONCURRED 
IN THE ADVICE GIVEN BY COUNSEL THAT HE NOT TESTIFY, AND 
A TRIAL COURT HAS NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO SUA SPONTE ASK 
A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANT IF HE OR SHE HAS WAIVED THE 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY. 
On appeal defendant argues that his right to testify at 
trial was violated by his trial attorney. During the pendency of 
this appeal, this Court temporarily remanded this case to the 
trial court for determination of that issue. After an 
evidentiary hearing, at which defendant and both of his trial 
attorneys testified, the trial court made the following findings: 
That [sic] defendant's right to testify was not 
violated, the Court concluding that the decision as to 
whether or not defendant should testify being a 
tactical decision, and that decision being [sic] made 
with the concurrence of the defendant by trial 
counsel[,] that the defendant's right to testify was 
not violated by counsel. 
(R. 158-59). 
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's finding that 
-4-
h nr 11 r n ill in I In In 1 i j . i l i nnnso ' l ' n a d v i c e n o t tn t e s t i f y The 
t r i d J c u u r l r e a d i e d t.hat c o n c l u s i o n a l t e r a s s e s s i n g t i ie 
t e s t i m o n i e s ot t h r e e w i t n e s s e s at the-1 e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
Becauun siifli ii flnt eiiii i iiiit i nil IN"M|"»>I | ni n 11 In i i n | I 111 * i i n d i l u l i l ^ 
and demeanor of t h e w i t n e s s e s o f f e r i n y c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n i e s , 
i t i s p r o p e r l y a f a c t u a l f i n d i n g and s h o u l d be r e v i e w e d unde r a 
c l e a r I "| i if i nnim m , Jl aiidaiiil .SctJ S t a l e u , lleuelman , 'I ' II1 "ill I \ V] 
(Utah 1986) ( In t h e c o n t e x t of a w a i v e r of t h e r i g h t , t o remain 
s i l e n t , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t w i l l r e v e r s e a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g 
0 I a i ii I. i II I I'M i vn i i HI III j1 in I I lii I i ml i in) i ii i III i >ii i I \ i i 11 menu1 " 11 iiiiii 
a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n , , ) . 
Even i f d e f e n d a n t ' s a rgument c o u l d be c o n s t r u e d as a 
cl l a l l e n g e t c tl i = • t r l a 1 cour I: s f i nd :i in ,\, IIH III e n d a n l . liiifa n u l 
"marshal[ed] a„,l 1 the 'evidence i n support of the trial court'!: 
find :i rigs and then demonstrate[d] that ev en v i e* - a uhe 
light most favorable to the cour t be J ow, 1:1 ite evidence i s 
insufficient to support the findings, Scharf v« BMG Corp. 
1 ' I I l|"ll* '' I 1 1 ' 1 1 i l l 1 1 1 1 1 1 " I" I 1N I • yjr d i s c S t a l e > , Boone , 
Adv. Rep V'I ?(l ('Utah App. October lit, 1990); State v. Moore, 
802 P.2d 737, i IH l(l | Utah App 1990); State v. Sherard, 169 Utah 
A i l \ h i ' i i " HI i II Il I lllli! ill I 11 < j p l M I I I H mi II Hi II I I II | II Il l i e 
a b s e n c e o f i i i i a i b l i a i i i i y , t h i s L o u i t n e e d n u t . t e v i e w a c h a l l e n g e t o 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . T h e r e f o t ir In i i u s e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t 
chc i 1 I eiritji-Hi I III in I  mi in in I i i mi i I I mi mi in I I mi in ( II ii i III I  in I IIIIII I  in II i ri i L hit III i i II I II in 
evidence in lavor of those findings, this Court must assume til 
correctness of the trial court's factual ruling. Accordingly, 
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the only matter for this Court to decide is whether defendant's 
concurrence with counsel's advice not to testify was a legally 
sufficient waiver of that right. 
On appeal defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of 
that waiver but suggests that the trial court has the affirmative 
duty to, sua sponte, determine on the record whether a defendant 
has waived the right (Br. of Appellant at 8). He generally 
argues that his right to testify, as guaranteed under article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, was violated by his trial 
counsel. In support of urging a specific state constitutional 
analysis of the issue, he purportedly quotes State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), as holding that the Utah Constitution 
can provide a "'somewhat different construction than its federal 
counterpart, based upon the context of the two documents'" (Br. 
of Appellant at 9). Although Larocco does not contain the 
aforementioned quote, the Utah Supreme Court did state in that 
case that it could be appropriate to construe article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution somewhat differently from the fourth 
amendment as a "'method for insulating this state's citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by federal courts.'" .Id. at 465 (citation omitted). 
In Larocco the Court chose to construe article I, section 14 
in a manner different from the United States Supreme Court's 
consruction of the substantially identical textual provisions of 
-6-
the fourth amendment*1 In the instant case defendant urges this 
Court to apply a state constitutional analysis under article I, 
section 12 rather than a sixth amendment analysis• However, 
article I, section 12 includes a critical phrase, absent in the 
sixth amendment, that specifically provides that in criminal 
prosecutions the accused "shall have the right . . . to testify 
in his own behalf." In the absence of an equivalent federal 
provision, defendant need not rely on Larocco to justify an 
analysis of the issue under the Utah Constitution. 
Notwithstanding that fact, defendant has not offered an 
independent analysis of the right to testify as guaranteed by 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Instead, he has 
exclusively argued the issue of the right to testify as it has 
developed through an analysis of the sixth, fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. Accordingly, the State also will address the issue 
based on a federal analysis. 
1
 The fourth amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
-7-
The right to present a person's own version of events in 
that person's own words is fundamental to a personal defense. 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709 (1987). 
Many courts have held that the right is so fundamental that it 
only can be waived by the defendant. See, e.g., United States 
v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Teaaue, 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990); Underwood v. Clark, 939 
F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162 
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749 (8th 
Cir. 1987); Bovd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C. 1991); 
People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984). 
Defendant suggests that, because the right to testify is 
fundamental, the court must "'engage in an on the record 
discussion with the defendant to ensure that she [sic] has 
knowingly waived her [sic] right to testify'" (Br. of Appellant 
at 8).2 Although defendant correctly cites People v. Curtis, 
2
 Here, defendant quotes from Bovd v. United States, 586 
A.2d at 675, stating that the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia imposed that requirement. However, Bovd 
is not a federal case but a case from the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, and the court did not impose that requirement. 
The full quote from that case reads: 
Many of the courts to consider the problem of post-
trial challenges based on denial of the right to 
testify have adopted the "colloquy" method: the trial 
judge must engage in an on-the-record discussion with 
the defendant to ensure that she has knowingly waived 
her right to testify, 
(citations omitted). In fact, the Bovd holding was much more 
limited. The court declined to decide whether a court has the 
sua sponte duty to conduct such a colloquy, holding only that a 
trial court has the duty to determine whether a defendant 
knowingly and intentionally waives the right to testify once it 
becomes aware that a defendant wants to testify. JEd. at 677. 
That holding suggests that a defendant has the affirmative duty 
-8-
681 P.2d at 515, in support of that proposition, the vast 
majority of courts, both federal and state, have declined to 
impose that absolute requirement. Those courts have held that a 
trial court has no affirmative duty, sua sponte, to address a 
silent defendant and inquire whether he or she is knowingly and 
intelligently waiving the right to testify and that a defendant's 
failure to testify or notify the court of his desire to testify 
provides a sufficient basis from which to infer that the right 
has been waived. See, e.g., United State v. Thompson, 944 P.2d 
1331 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162 (4th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 
1989); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 
1036, 104 S.Ct. 1310 (1984); State v. Allie, 147 Ariz. 320, 710 
P.2d 430, 437-38 (1985); Araaon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 
1174 (1988); State v. Duran, 105 N.M. 231, 731 P.2d 374 (1986). 
In the instant case defendant did not make it known to the 
court at trial that he wished to testify (transcript of hearing 
on remand at 6). The trial court had no sua sponte duty to 
advise him of that right. On that basis alone this Court could 
find that defendant's right to testify had not been violated. 
However, after an evidentiary hearing on the issue the trial 
court specifically found that defendant had concurred with the 
decision that he not testify at trial. Therefore, defendant's 
of asserting the right in the trial. 
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current claim that he was denied that right has no basis in fact 
or law, and it should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction 
submitted to the jury was inadequate in light of the United 
States Supreme Court decision, Cage v. Louisiana. U.S. , 
111 S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990). This Court has previously approved 
the precise instruction given in this case after having 
considered the directives of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and State v. Ireland, 773 
P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). State v. Pederson, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
App. 1990) (a copy of the instruction is attached hereto as 
Addendum B). 
However, defendant contends that the jury instructions in 
Cage v. Louisiana and the instant case are sufficiently similar 
so that the instruction must be construed to be invalid. In 
support thereof, defendant asserts that both instructions "repeat 
the use of the term 'reasonable doubt' in order to define the 
concept of reasonable doubt . . .[and] [consequently, the 
instruction given in this case fails to give the jury any 
guidance " (Br. of Appellant at 12). That assertion is 
incorrect. The instruction given does not repeat the term 
"reasonable doubt" as a definition of that term. Moreover, much 
of the instruction is identical to the instruction offered by 
defendant, and defendant has not challenged those portions that 
-10-
are different (a copy of defendant's instruction is attached 
hereto as Addendum C). 
Finally, Cage specifically condemned the combined use of 
phrases equating a reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty," 
"actual substantial doubt," and "moral certainty." The 
combination of this terminology, even when viewed in the context 
of the instructions as a whole, allowed for a "finding of guilt 
based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process 
Clause." Cage, 111 S. Ct. at 329-30. But, these terms were not 
used in defendant's case. Therefore, Cage has no applicability 
to the instant instruction. This Court has already rejected a 
challenge to the instruction given in this case on the basis of 
Cage. State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 932 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). 
Accord State of Idaho v. Rhoades, 809 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1991); Lord 
v. State of Nevada, 806 P.2d 548 (Nev. 1991). Therefore, 
defendant's argument should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 day of January, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
\_Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
Kenneth R. Brown AllR 1 fi iqqi 
BROWN & COX HUU I O 1031 
Attorneys for Defendant <?VTL-- • .Y 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 ~ *""' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 u y^° ^^Tr 
A L^^Jty Cert* 
Telephone: (801) 363-3550 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONNIE S. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY WAS NOT 
VIOLATED 
Case No. 901900454 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
The above-entitled matter, having come on before the Court 
for Evidentiary Hearing on July 16, 1991, the Court having heard 
the evidence presented by the defendant, as well as evidence 
presented by the State, and being advised pursuant to an Order of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, dated the 26th day of February, 1991, 
remanding the case back to the Third District Court for the 
resolution of the issue as to whether the defendant's right to 
testify was violated by trial counsel, the Court makes the 
following Findings and Order: 
riNPINSS; 
That defendant's right to testify was not violated, the 
Court concluding that the decision as to whether or not defendant 
should testify being a tactical decision, and that decision being 
made with the concurrence of the defendant by trial counsel that 
the defendant's right to testify was not violated by trial counsel. 
000!*8 
ORDER: 
Having made the above-referred to Findings, the Court 
denies defendant's motion for a new trial, and further pursuant to 
the Remand Order of the Utah Court of Appeals, finds that 
defendant's right to testify was not violated by trial counsel. 
DATED this / (: day of X ^ Z / j . 1991. 
BY TR 
Bvf /v^-a£?g^^*/7' 
&AK£S S. SAWAYA {/ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE QT SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /&*day of August, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Thomas P. Vuyck, Esq. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
fl.fln fliSfrlTkM). 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO._LiL_ 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
oooca 
APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether a defendant's guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he or she is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Now 
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it 
must arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case. 
If, after careful and impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, you can candidly say 
that you have the kind of doubt which would cause a person to 
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt. 
Deciding that someone has committed a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt is different from making decisions concerning the 
more weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of life, a person 
looks forward and, based on a degree of hope, determination and 
personal resolve, makes a decision that involves a degree of risk. 
However, this decision is revocable or at least salvageable. 
« > 
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